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Abstract: 
 
 
The research in this paper is to be focused on examining governance and enterprise restructuring 
in Southeast Europe (Western Balkans) transition economies. International organizations 
classify the following countries in Southeast Europe (Western Balkans): Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. 
 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has governance and enterprise 
restructuring as basic indicator of economic transition and defines it as effective corporate 
governance and corporate control exercised through domestic financial institutions and markets, 
fostering market-driven restructuring. The corporate governance is most often defined in terms 
of the roles, responsibilities, and interactions of top management and the board of directors.  
 
Using data of Southeast European economies, will be examined the interrelationships between 
governance and enterprise restructuring and set of policies that influence the governance 
patterns. 
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Introduction 
 
The research in this paper is to be focused on examining governance and enterprise restructuring 
in Southeast Europe (Western Balkans) transition economies. International organizations 
classify the following countries in Southeast Europe (Western Balkans): Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. 
 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has governance and enterprise 
restructuring as basic indicator of economic transition and defines it as effective corporate 
governance and corporate control exercised through domestic financial institutions and markets, 
fostering market-driven restructuring. The corporate governance is most often defined in terms 
of the roles, responsibilities, and interactions of top management and the board of directors.  
 
Using data of South-East European economies, will be examined the interrelationships between 
governance and enterprise restructuring and set of policies that influence the governance 
patterns. 
 
Two basic hypotheses to test governance and enterprise restructuring: 
 
 1st Hypothesis: governance and enterprise restructuring depend on set of policies : large-
scale privatization, small-scale privatization, price liberalization, competition policy, 
trade and foreign exchange system, banking reform and interest rate liberalization, 
securities markets and non-bank financial institutions and overall infrastructure reform; 
 2nd Hypothesis: governance and enterprise restructuring is important and improves over 
time due to imposed policies. 
 
The academic significance of the topic is in determining the factors that influence governance 
and enterprise restructuring, as well as, its overall significance in the development of Western 
Balkans transition economies. 
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Theoretical and literature framework  
 
1. The theory of privatization 
 
The theory of privatization is narrowly tied to the countries that have gone through overall 
process of command economy and holistic public ownership of the means of production and 
clarifies that such ownership suffers serious efficiency loss, agency problems and political 
interference in the management of firms. Thus, information asymmetries and incomplete 
contracting problems, lead to severe incentive default which is main problem for efficiency 
losses (Zinnes, Eilat, & Sachs, 2001). Hence, the incentive–efficiency pattern i.e. agency 
problem has two manifestations. The first, the managerial problem consists of failure of the 
state to monitor managers in state owned companies, i.e. the managers tend to maximize their 
own utility function instead of the owners. Further, the companies do not have market value, the 
separation of ownership and control was not possible (Vickers & Yarrow, 1990). The second is 
the political problem of constant political obstruction and distortion of objectives from profit to 
employment maximization (Boycko, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1996; Shapiro & Willig, 1990; Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1994).  
 
In transition economies the most prominent way to make the transformation and initial 
privatization was done through transfer of the ownership form public to private hands through 
the so-called  ‘shock therapy’ i.e. ‘transfer as fast as possible’ (Kołodko, 2000; Lipton, Sachs, & 
Summers, 1990). The other possible advocated way was ‘gradual sales’(Kornai, 1990).  Thus, in 
overall transition theory it is widely believed that once the ownership is in private hands the 
market forces will spin processes that are going to eventually create all necessary institutions 
through the need of them as unavoidable feedback, hence the emerging shareholder class is to 
require and put in place corporate governance institutions insuring control over managers 
(Balcerowicz, 1993; Sachs, 1996; Stiglitz, 1998).  
 
The privatization processes due to existing theory and lack of practice, triggered three basic 
methods of privatization depending on the country, institutional and intellectual environment 
(Bennett, 2004a, 2004b) :  
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1. MASS privatization - firms sold at a zero (or nominal) price 
2. FULL privatization - firms sold to outsiders for positive prices 
3. MIXED privatization - manager-employee buyouts (MEBOs), leased buyouts and all 
other cases. 
 
Figure I.1 Transition economies: Southeast Europe 1  
 Country Classification 
of 
Privatization 
Year of 
Privatization 
Primary 
Method 
Secondary 
Method 
1. Albania Mixed 1995 MEBO vouchers 
2. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Mixed 1996 MEBO direct sales 
3. Croatia Mixed 1992 MEBO vouchers 
4. Macedonia Mixed 1993 MEBO direct sales 
5. Montenegro Mixed 1993 MEBO direct sales 
6. Serbia  Mixed 1993 MEBO direct sales 
 
2. National governance systems 
 
The two important things that have to be taken under consideration while analyzing national 
governance systems and corporate governance are the influence of different stakeholders of the 
national system of governance to shape the strategic decision making at firm level and the 
influence of the corporate governance institutions and overall governance on the country’s 
attractiveness for international investment (Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009; McGee & 
Preobragenskaya, 2004). 
 
As a result, the influence of different stakeholders of the national system of governance on the 
strategic decision making at firm level is seen through the pattern of competitive advantage of 
the firm, as well as, the possibility these institutions to enable or restrict business practices (ex. 
protection of investors, protection of employees, minority stakeholder protection, etc.) 
(Filatotchev, Wright, Uhlenbruck, Tihanyi, & Hoskisson, 2003). 
                                               
1 Bennett, John, Estrin, Saul, Maw, James, Urga, Giovanni, 2004b. Privatization methods and economic growth in 
transition economies. CEPR 4291. 
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The second important issue is that the institutional framework and the institutional governance 
regime can influence attractiveness for international investment. Hence, it has been noted the 
impact on the nature of foreign market entry modes or the extent to which certain market entry 
can facilitate the transfer of resources from entrant to entrée and vice-versa (Denis & McConnell, 
2005). Further, here it is important to stress that institutional differences between countries have 
an effect on their corporate governance regimes (Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). 
 
Analytical Framework 
 
1. Sample selection and Data 
 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Transition Report series have 
the latest information on the countries that are classified in transition. The data that this 
prominent organization offers are based on wide network of sources that they obtain from 
national and international authorities (Bennett, 2004a, 2004b; Zinnes et al., 2001). EBRD tracks 
reforms and assesses the overall process of transition using set of transition indicators, which are 
formed in comparison to the standards of industrialized market economies.  
Further, the data sample is mainly drawn from the extended research and data bases of the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Transition Report publication 
series. Consequently, the data used in this research are taken from their index structure 
‘economic statistics and forecasts’ (EBRD, 1994-2009). The scale used in shaping the transition 
indicators ranges from 1 to 4+, ‘where 1 represents little or no change from a rigid centrally 
planned economy and 4+ represents the standards of an industrialized market economy’ (EBRD, 
1994-2009). There are detailed numbers for the countries in transition analyzing the period of 
1989 to 2009 in different areas. These indicators are sorted by sector and country and are 
analyzing nine arias: large scale privatization, small scale privatization, governance and 
enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange system, competition 
policy, banking reform and interest rate liberalization, securities markets and non-bank financial 
institutions, and overall infrastructure reform (EBRD, 1994-2009; Gouret, 2007). 
Figure I.2 Transition Indicators Methodology 
Transition Indicators Methodology 
Classif
ication 
system 
Large-scale 
privatization 
(LSP) 
Small-scale 
privatization 
(SSP) 
Governance 
and enterprise 
restructuring 
(GOV) 
Price 
liberalization 
(PL) 
Competition 
policy (CP) 
Trade and 
foreign 
exchange 
system (TFS) 
Banking 
reform and 
interest rate 
liberalization 
(BRIRL) 
Securities 
markets and 
non-bank 
financial 
institutions 
(SMNBFI) 
Overall 
infrastructure 
reform (OIR) 2 
1 Little private 
ownership 
Little progress Soft budget 
constraints; 
few other 
reforms to 
promote 
corporate 
governance 
Most prices 
formally 
controlled by the 
government 
No competition 
legislation and 
institutions 
Widespread 
import and/or 
export controls 
or very limited 
legitimate 
access to 
foreign 
exchange 
Little progress 
beyond 
establishment 
of a two-tier 
system 
Little progress Little progress 
2 Comprehensive 
scheme almost 
ready for 
implementation; 
some sales 
completed 
Substantial 
share privatized 
Moderately 
tight credit and 
subsidy policy; 
little action 
taken to 
strengthen 
competition 
and corporate 
governance 
Some lifting of 
price 
administration; 
state 
procurement at 
non-market 
prices for the 
majority of 
product 
categories 
Competition 
policy 
legislation and 
institutions set 
up; some 
reduction of 
entry restrictions 
or enforcement 
action on 
dominant firms 
Some 
liberalization 
of import 
and/or export 
controls; 
almost full 
current account 
convertibility  
Significant 
liberalization of 
interest rates 
and credit 
allocation; 
limited use of 
directed credit 
or interest rate 
ceilings 
Formation of 
securities 
exchanges, 
market-makers 
and brokers; 
some trading in 
government 
paper and/or 
securities 
Moderate 
degree of 
progress 
3 More than 25 per 
cent of large-
scale enterprise 
assets in private 
hands, but 
possibly with 
major unresolved 
issues regarding 
corporate 
governance 
Comprehensive 
programme 
almost ready for 
implementation 
Significant and 
sustained 
actions to 
harden budget 
constraints and 
to promote 
corporate 
governance 
effectively  
Significant 
progress on price 
liberalization, 
but state 
procurement at 
non-market 
prices remains 
substantial 
Some 
enforcement 
actions to reduce 
abuse of market 
power and to 
promote a 
competitive 
environment; 
substantial 
reduction of 
entry restrictions 
Removal of 
almost all 
quantitative 
and 
administrative 
import and 
export 
restrictions; 
almost full 
current account 
convertibility 
Substantial 
progress in 
establishment 
of bank 
solvency and of 
a framework for 
prudential 
supervision and 
regulation 
Substantial 
issuance of 
securities by 
private 
enterprises; 
establishment of 
independent 
share registries, 
secure clearance 
and settlement 
procedures 
Fair degree of 
progress 
                                               
2 calculated as the average of five infrastructure reform indicators covering electric power, railways, roads, telecommunications, water and waste water 
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4 More than 50 per 
cent of state-
owned enterprise 
and farm assets 
in private 
ownership and 
significant 
progress with 
corporate 
governance of 
these enterprises 
Complete 
privatization of 
small 
companies with 
tradable 
ownership 
rights 
Substantial 
improvement 
in corporate 
governance 
and significant 
new 
investment at 
the enterprise 
level, 
including 
minority 
holdings by 
financial 
investors 
Comprehensive 
price 
liberalization; 
state 
procurement at 
non-market 
prices largely 
phased out; only 
a small number 
of administered 
prices remain 
Significant 
enforcement 
actions to reduce 
abuse of market 
power and to 
promote a 
competitive 
environment 
Removal of all 
quantitative 
and 
administrative 
import and 
export 
restrictions  
Significant 
movement of 
banking laws 
and regulations 
towards BIS 
standards 
Securities laws 
and regulations 
approaching 
IOSCO 
standards; 
substantial 
market liquidity 
and 
capitalization; 
well-functioning 
non-bank 
financial 
institutions and 
effective 
regulation 
Large degree of 
progress 
4+ Standards and 
performance 
typical of 
advanced 
industrial 
economies: more 
than 75 per cent 
of enterprise 
assets in private 
ownership with 
effective 
corporate 
governance 
Standards and 
performance 
typical of 
advanced 
industrial 
economies: no 
state ownership 
of small 
enterprises; 
effective 
tradability of 
land 
Standards and 
performance 
typical of 
advanced 
industrial 
economies: 
effective 
corporate 
control 
exercised 
through 
domestic 
financial 
institutions 
and markets, 
fostering 
market-driven 
restructuring 
Standards and 
performance 
typical of 
advanced 
industrial 
economies: 
complete price 
liberalization 
with no price 
control outside 
housing, 
transport and 
natural 
monopolies 
Standards and 
performance 
typical of 
advanced 
industrial 
economies: 
effective 
enforcement of 
competition 
policy; 
unrestricted 
entry to most 
markets 
Standards and 
performance 
norms of 
advanced 
industrial 
economies: 
removal of 
most tariff 
barriers; 
membership in 
WTO 
Standards and 
performance 
norms of 
advanced 
industrial 
economies: full 
convergence of 
banking laws 
and regulations 
with BIS 
standards; 
provision of full 
set of 
competitive 
banking 
services 
Standards and 
performance 
norms of 
advanced 
industrial 
economies: full 
convergence of 
securities laws 
and regulations 
with IOSCO 
standards; fully 
developed non-
bank 
intermediation 
Standards and 
performance 
norms of 
advanced 
industrial 
economies 
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2. Model and Econometrics  
 
The econometric model that is used in this study is a regression model where we have estimated 
the fallowing equation (Freedman, 2005) : 
 
ipipio xxi   ...11    (1) 
 
ni ,...1    (2) 
 
Thus, applied to our research this model has the fallowing shape: 
 
titititititioti OIRSMNBFIBRIRLTFSCPPLSSPLSPGOV ,t i,8t  i,7t i,6,5,4,3,2,1,  
(3) 
 where the dependent variable, tiGOV , . shows governance and enterprise restructuring;  
 the independent variables, are as follows :  
1. tiLSP ,  large-scale privatization;  
2. tiSSP ,  small-scale privatization;  
3. tiPL ,  price liberalization; 
4. tiCP , competition policy;  
5. tiTFS ,  trade and foreign exchange system;  
6. t i,BRIRL banking reform and interest rate liberalization;  
7. t  i,SMNBFI securities markets and non-bank financial institutions;  
8. t i,OIR overall infrastructure reform; 
   is a p-dimensional parameter vector ;  
   is the error term or noise. 
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Results and Effects 
 
1. Results on the first assumption  
 
 
The first hypothesis is that governance and enterprise restructuring depend on set of policies: 
large-scale privatization, small-scale privatization, price liberalization, competition policy, trade 
and foreign exchange system, banking reform and interest rate liberalization, securities markets 
and non-bank financial institutions and overall infrastructure reform. The transition theory 
explains well the effects of privatization, restructuring, competition, budget constraints, policies 
of governance and management (Djankov & Murrell, 2002). 
  
The country results of the OLS regression (Figure 3) show that there is important development of 
governance and enterprise restructuring during the period of transition. Yet, the effect of the 
variables that most influence governance and enterprise restructuring in this set of countries is 
mixed. When analyzed the large-scale privatization variable (Filatotchev & Mickiewicz, 2003) 
and its impact on countries’ governance and enterprise restructuring it was found that there is 
positive impact in B&H, Croatia and Montenegro, negative in Albania, Macedonia and 
significant Serbia (p < 0.01).   
 
Further, small-scale privatization influenced governance and enterprise restructuring positively 
in Albania, Croatia and Montenegro, negatively in B&H and Serbia and is significant in 
Macedonia (p < 0.01).  When analyzed price liberalization as important milestone and instrument 
of transition we can see that there is upbeat influence in B&H, Macedonia and Serbia, however 
on the other hand it behaves indifferent in Albania, Croatia and Montenegro. The trade and 
foreign exchange system were liberalized and recently they are being made compatible to the 
European Union’s internal market as these countries approach the euro-integration processes (De 
Macedo & Martins, 2008). In the period of our observation the trade and foreign exchange 
system gave good results in almost all countries except Montenegro and Serbia where the results 
are mixed in relation to governance and enterprise restructuring. 
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Legislating the competition policy and imposing it properly in the countries of transition was and 
still remains important issue, especially because of the fact that the command systems were 
characterized with state monopolies and as such were protected and nourished through the ‘soft-
budget constraint’ practice.  The relation of competition policy to governance and enterprise 
restructuring is positive in Croatia; negative in Albania, B&H, and Serbia; significant in 
Macedonia and in the case of Montenegro it gave mixed results depending on the model. The 
banking reform and interest rate liberalization show good results in all countries, as well as, the 
reform on securities’ markets and non-bank financial institutions except Serbia in the latter case.  
Finally, the overall infrastructure reform gave negative outcome in almost all countries and it is 
most probably due to the fact that the disinvestment in infrastructure is constant lag in transition 
countries. 
 
Almost two decades of transition is fairly enough to allow good research on the links between 
different economic reforms. It is worthwhile to stress that all these countries started from highly 
distorted system and were introduced with policy reforms designed to introduce market 
mechanisms in order to make the allocation of resources as efficient as possible, while creating 
conditions for sustainable growth and improvement of living standards (De Macedo & Martins, 
2008). 
 
Therefore, examining these various variables which represent introduced policies in SEE 
countries that undergo stressful process of overall society transformation, confirms the 
uneasiness of the overall process, as well as, the varied impact of any of these policies to each 
other and supplementary policy issues. 
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Figure I.3 OLS analysis of SEE  
OLS
Independ
ent 
Variable [1] [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] [1] [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]
lsp -0.2025152 -0.0091404 -0.0995574 -0.1087974 0.1524874 0.5323872 0.1518928 0.1427749
[0.1869121] [0.196053] [0.1938835] [0.2215698] [0.1927293] [0.0934086]*** [0.2038962] [0.1673499]
ssp 0.1697118 0.113114 0.0523193 0.1329074 0.2199953 -0.0249437 -0.0121364 -0.0790883 0.0331294 -0.0236488
[0.1140906] [0.1021058] [0.1198221] [0.1221306] [0.1358211] [0.0670438] [0.0641176] [0.0706895] [0.0595877] [0.0635731] 
pl -0.5347679 -0.4286216 -0.1531503 -0.3067557 0.0047178 0.0010322 0.023237 -0.0199307 0.0038191
[0.2250317]** [0.2039378]* [0.0938002] [0.2508544] [0.030858] [0.0300623] [0.033675] [0.0282685] [0.0287377]
tfs 0.2659353 0.2188564 -0.0519644 0.1287879 0.0304187 0.0289083 0.0500963 0.040704 0.0302822
[0.1448371]* [0.1390868] [0.0646881] [0.163219] [0.0421192] [0.0414663] [0.046701] [0.0440357] [0.0404747]
cp -0.9840253 -0.9071432 -0.6432593 -0.737975 -0.1425858 -0.0980406 -0.2358234 -0.1238071 -0.1384151
[0.3731757]** [0.3688099]** [0.4014111] [0.3787193]* [0.0838911] [0.0612916] [0.081922]** [0.0878757] [0.0730635]*
brirl 1.314167 1.218124 1.014514 1.110516 0.909408 0.343431 0.4561517 0.3475343 0.3471329
[0.2302564]*** [0.2139265]*** [0.2244712]*** [0.219414]*** [0.2072327]*** [0.1575498]** [0.066292]*** [0.1666564]* [0.1483936]**
smnbfi 1.213578 0.961111 0.7779803 0.9003803 0.2111793 0.2410562 0.2408255 0.2464227 0.230991
[0.4536104]** [0.3917815]** [0.483435] [0.4570451]* [0.2988371] [0.1509508] [0.1487633] [0.1713305] [0.1194542]*
oir -0.0590973 -0.2489107 -0.3570052 -0.2381512 -0.2090029 -0.0125967 0.0238195 -0.0593761 0.0846555
[0.2398549] [0.164919] [0.2382509] [0.2382847] [0.2813609] [0.1072611] [0.0954801] [0.1192966] [0.0934118]
Constant -0.2375678 0.0375653 0.2045319 0.0674559 0.0841613 0.415223 0.3535272 0.5706266 0.4295954 0.4128298
[0.305147] [0.1703371] [0.2818152] [0.2783297] [0.3377157] [0.1236471]*** [0.0945685]*** [0.1146797]*** [0.1304645]*** [0.1172391]***
Observatio
ns
R-squared 0.9197 0.8858 0.9208 0.9084 0.8964 0.9132 0.9023 0.9165 0.8796 0.9031
Adj R-sqrd 0.8329 0.732 0.8089 0.8207 0.7022 0.7719 0.7727 0.7638 0.7686 0.7741
Time 
period 
Significanc
e Level: *** p < 0.01  ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Dependent Variable
Governance and enterprise restructuring 
Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina
189 189
1989-2009 1989-2009
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(Continuation)  
 
OLS
Independ
ent 
Variable [1] [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] [1] [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]
lsp 0.0867059 0.1722811 0.1101601 0.1563948 0.1060924 -0.0400841 -0.0718089 -0.0403039 -0.0307779 -0.0546197
[0.1623609] [0.1582185] [0.161339] [0.18769] [0.1554621] [0.0844591] [0.1341494] [0.0802903] [0.0713962] [0.0730469]
ssp 0.4950602 0.2166759 0.1684129 0.3327732 0.954126 0.9522068 0.9881459 0.9583012
[0.3365614] [0.2057257] [0.362504] [0.2052517] [0.2081172]*** [0.1715753]*** [0.1410507]*** [0.2009124]***
pl -0.2011024 -0.2331644 -0.2224021 -0.3456276 -0.2169713 0.0632146 -0.0857734 0.0617463 0.0625092 0.0386737
[0.2102789] [0.218306] [0.2099915] [0.2369092] [0.2036779] [0.1236557] [0.190142] [0.0891231] [0.1190298] [0.1024566]
tfs 0.2000222 0.2545105 0.2015001 0.3652061 0.2019553 -0.0019025 0.2475254 -0.0020039 0.0035742
[0.1825499] [0.1865807] [0.1831606]** [0.1990339]** [0.178128] [0.1059441] [0.1448785] [0.1020113] [0.1014893]
cp 0.1432924 0.342051 0.2940192 0.4140078 0.2362731 0.3170152 0.3173858 0.3167068 0.3163479 0.2908476
[0.2006051] [0.1547635]* [0.1396094]* [0.1961021]* [0.1293934]* [0.0978953]*** [0.1560151]* [0.0925978]*** [0.0942207]*** [0.0681516]***
brirl -0.3266856 0.0386626 0.1067575 -0.1579131 0.0324758 0.4920464 0.0324864 0.031418
[0.3132069] [0.1991627] [0.3026532] [0.149381] [0.141122] [0.158304]*** [0.1355862] [0.1363957]
smnbfi 0.6654675 0.5052497 0.5034725 0.6197397 0.2358248 0.1866295 0.235749 0.2379681 0.2128045
[0.2732843]** [0.2616168]** [0.2256206]* [0.2567298]** [0.101816]** [0.16136] [0.0977389]** [0.0976263]** [0.0796935]**
oir 0.2254391 -0.1937215 -0.1067123 -0.0153547 -0.0878511 -0.1422885 -0.0873017 -0.0868301
[0.3650046] [0.2380797] [0.1789828] [0.4126282] [0.2280277] [0.3629135] [0.2171038] [0.2195233]
Constant -1.183368 0.3480587 -0.1845918 0.0845048 -0.5886388 -2.513445 -0.0655663 -2.507403 -2.592015 -2.495099
[1.22832] [0.6803362] [0.771904] [1.30652] [0.7442398] [0.5982257]*** [0.4299509] [0.4752273]*** [0.4729974]*** [0.5764654]***
Observatio
ns
R-squared 0.9138 0.9091 0.8714 0.9009 0.873 0.9085 0.9182 0.9385 0.8884 0.9283
Adj R-sqrd 0.8563 0.7524 0.756 0.8398 0.7584 0.7808 0.7511 0.7822 0.7822 0.782
Time 
period 
Significanc
e Level: *** p < 0.01  ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Dependent Variable
Governance and enterprise restructuring 
Croatia Macedonia
189 189
1989-2009 1989-2009
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(Continuation) 
 
OLS
Independ
ent 
Variable [1] [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] [1] [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]
lsp 0.025029 0.0148113 0.1000957 0.4965677 0.8198633 0.6901091 1.215844 0.4492792
[0.1759028] [0.1404694] [0.1484071] [0.1516168]*** [0.2032582]*** [0.1612398]*** [0.1923572]*** [0.1323666]***
ssp 0.0523883 0.0504735 0.0498742 0.0356797 0.1493854 -0.1517718 0.2077483 -0.3517117 -0.0360644
[0.0519841] [0.0482828] [0.0442783] [0.0472367] [0.0595531]* [0.1455706] [0.1697228] [0.1624512]* [0.15511]
pl -0.0168126 -0.0205609 -0.0221255 -0.0194509 0.0821115 0.0314483 0.0341681 0.034297 0.0076732 0.0232123
[0.0705467] [0.0629292] [0.0469451] [0.0695862] [0.0876976] [0.0363242] [0.0535565] [0.0363423] [0.0446733] [0.0412353]
tfs -0.0099158 -0.0023913 0.0090979 -0.1932485 -0.0313151 -0.0395058 -0.0341518 0.0052779 -0.0260193
[0.095012] [0.0759026] [0.0909889] [0.1072942]* [0.0371104] [0.0546432] [0.0371342] [0.044111] [0.0422617]
cp 0.0014707 -0.0116057 -0.0042167 0.0613188 0.1629844 -0.037234 -0.1289785 -0.100937 0.0683665 -0.0301026
[0.1386809] [0.0998683] [0.1225776] [0.1165131] [0.1775493] [0.0757477] [0.1065472] [0.0449211]** [0.084176] [0.0863631]
brirl 0.1421806 0.1549766 0.1377794 0.1097489 0.325636 0.6203257 0.3793379 0.3638281
[0.1730948] [0.1422178] [0.1613662] [0.2349382] [0.1105069]** [0.122265]*** [0.0980954] [0.1245697]***
smnbfi 0.9357051 0.9654005 0.9513829 0.9237234 -0.4687327 0.2305621 -0.3899315 -0.565573
[0.2699023]*** [0.1645741]*** [0.2155338]*** [0.2661146]*** [0.2111187]** [0.1776636] [0.1977843]*** [0.2630502]*
oir 0.060445 0.0686007 0.0684553 0.0967382 -0.1477279 -0.0053487 -0.0255009 -0.0058332 0.0193794 -0.0143822
[0.1446265] [0.127682] [0.1178239] [0.135978] [0.1788415] [0.0329571] [0.0480387] [0.0330639]* [0.0402005] [0.0373218]
Constant -0.2729809 -0.2817912 -0.2698268 -0.269522 0.0150051 0.7784118 -0.3498587 0.3806653 1.281046 0.3166287
[0.2118772] [0.1948428] [0.201575] [0.2091682] [0.2649403] [0.4012921]** [0.4243155] [0.1249024]*** [0.4581707]** [0.391632]
Observatio
ns
R-squared 0.9199 0.8999 0.9099 0.9188 0.8898 0.9077 0.9145 0.8974 0.906 0.8967
Adj R-sqrd 0.7665 0.7691 0.7691 0.7674 0.7382 0.7961 0.7915 0.7961 0.7938 0.7949
Time 
period 
Significanc
e Level: *** p < 0.01  ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Dependent Variable
Governance and enterprise restructuring 
Montenegro Serbia
189 189
1989-2009 1989-2009
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2. Results on the second assumption  
 
The second hypothesis is that the variable governance and enterprise restructuring is important 
and improves over time due to imposed policies.  
 
The EBRD assesses progress in transition through a set of transition indicators which are used to 
track reform developments since the commencement of transition (EBRD, 1994-2009). Using 
these indicators and the examination of the tables in the Figure 3 and Figure 4, allows us to 
measure the possible outcomes of the second hypothesis.  
 
The country results (Figure 3 and Figure 4) confirm this hypothesis with some mixed outcomes 
i.e. is important and lethargically improves over time. In fact, the close relation with number of 
these policies shows the significant impact of the policies to the way governance and enterprise 
restructuring was imposed, positively or negatively.  Thus, there is good correlation to analyzed 
variables that represent the manner observed policies have been developing during the period of 
transition, however mixed outcomes to how each of these variables impacts governance and 
enterprise restructuring. Nonetheless, over time most of the variables improved and it is clear 
that there is noteworthy relationship between them moving upwards. 
 
Further in Figure 4 (and Figure 3 in many segments when observed through particular variables) 
we can analyze the movements of governance and enterprise restructuring over time. Indeed, in 
this study the analyzed variable (governance and enterprise restructuring) moved towards 
increase and positive upward climb indicated through the rise of all countries’ curves. Hence, it 
can be noted that most of the progress has been done in Croatia, followed by Macedonia (IFC, 
2008). In the mid range is Serbia and in the lower part of governance and enterprise restructuring 
progress are Montenegro, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, Figure 4 confirms the 
positive movement up, relative to the process of transition over time. 
16 
 
Figure I.4 Governance and enterprise restructuring dynamics over time 
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Discussion  
 
Due to the analysis of the first assumption where a relation was made between governance and 
enterprise restructuring and imposed set of policies, the results have shown that there are mixed 
outcomes. Indeed, there are positive and negative pressures of introduced policies on governance 
and enterprise restructuring in the set of SEE countries, however it is evident that overall, there is 
satisfactory picture of governance and enterprise restructuring progress. 
 
The second hypothesis analyzed the importance and progress of corporate governance and 
enterprise restructuring. Hence, due to this observation, conducted through combination of the 
basic findings of the first analyzed assumption and the compared movement of only corporate 
governance and enterprise restructuring variables of the countries in question, it was found 
evidence that the transition process progresses along with the imposed reforms, and policies 
triggered a positive inclination of governance and enterprise restructuring. 
 
However, the overall outcome of these countries is mixed as there are significant improvements 
in some countries and noteworthy lags in other. Indeed, it is needed considerable improvement in 
corporate governance, institution-building controlling agency problems and imposing already 
adopted regulation, as well as, adopting new ways of enterprise restructuring policies within 
existing policies of overall transition economy restructuring.  
18 
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